Mechanistic and Organic Models of Public Administration in Developing Countries
Author(s): R. S. Milne
Reviewed work(s):
Published by: Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2391188
Accessed: 06/03/2012 00:11

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve
and extend access to Administrative Science Quarterly.
R. S. Milne

Mechanistic and Organic Models of Public Administration in Developing Countries

The analysis by Riggs and Thompson of the shortcomings of public administration in developing countries are discussed. Thompson advocates some kind of organic model for these countries as opposed to the varieties of the mechanistic model which developing countries usually try to follow. In fact the cultures in developing countries do not permit either mechanistic or organic organizations to work effectively. Hypotheses are advanced on the differences in organizational loyalty and on the effects of formal and informal organization between developing and developed countries.

In the last few years increasing attention has been given to the construction of models designed to explain public administration in developing countries. Perhaps the most comprehensive models are Riggs' (1957; 1962; 1964; 1965). Some features of Riggs' models are discussed in other works (Berger, 1957; Braibanti, 1969; Heady, 1959; Montgomery and Siffin, 1966; and Pye, 1962). Tickner (1959) said of an early work of Riggs (1957) that the model needed to be narrowed in scope in order to produce middle-range theory which could be tested empirically. However, although this process has only been started, the work done has clearly revealed the inadequacies of public administration in developing countries, despite the technical aid and assistance provided to help the developing countries follow the Western example. Riggs' models, although they necessarily do not correspond to the situation in any one country, bring out many of the important problems.

FORMALITY, RITUAL, AND CENTRALIZATION

Three aspects of Riggs' models are considered: formalism; ritualistic methods; and lack of delegation and the appearance of centralization.

Formalism refers to "the degree of discrepancy or congruence between the formally prescribed and the effectively practiced, between norms and realities . . . . What permits formalism is the lack of pressure toward program objectives, the weakness of social power as a guide of bureaucratic performance, and hence great permissiveness for arbitrary administration" (Riggs, 1962: 21). Riggs underlined the futility of changing laws and regulations in such a situation, because it is unlikely that they will be followed by effective changes in behavior. Yet there is constant pressure on developing countries to raise apparent standards of administration in order to conform to international norms or to satisfy the requirements set by developed countries when they provide technical aid (Riggs, 1963). An increase in formalism follows.

Riggs (1962) emphasizes ritualistic procedures, and distinguishes between ritualistic procedures looking towards the past, and rationalistic procedures, copying developed societies. Both approaches are mimetic. Techniques are followed as ends in themselves, irrespective of their relevance to the context in which they are introduced (cf. Pye, 1962).

In the Riggs model, superior officials do not delegate much authority to subordinates. This failure has been explained in terms of a lack of shared values among different ranks of the hierarchy (Siffin, 1966), the conceptions of authority and value in society (Braibanti, 1966), the incompetence or lack of training of subordinates (Fox and Joiner, 1963), and the loss of opportunities to earn income corruptly (Riggs, 1964).
Subordinates are also reluctant to accept and exercise delegated powers. In the Philippines, the “strategy of passing troublesome business along for someone else to worry about, or of exercising the official prerogative of brushing off the inquiring citizen, seems less risky than would making a decision which might be rejected further up the hierarchy or might be proved wrong by later events” (Heady, 1957:265). In Latin America there is said to be little room for delegating authority, both because of the low level of competence of intermediate echelons of the public service and because of “the reluctance of the middle layers to take on or accept responsibility for policy decisions” (Campos, 1967:286). The absence of delegation does not imply that there is effective centralization, only that there is the appearance of centralization. “Statements about ‘over-centralization’ of power reflect one surface of this pattern. The other surface might just as well be called ‘undercentralization,’ for in respect to effective control the prismatic bureaucracy is almost anarchic, offering few substantial curbs to the expediency interests of subordinate officials” (Riggs, 1964:281; see also Tullock, 1965). There is a wide gap between formal power and effective power. Indeed, in developing countries attempted tight centralization or close supervision might be regarded as desperate bids, doomed to fail, to counteract the strong, predominant centrifugal forces.

Other writers on developing countries have remarked on implementation problems, for instance in India (Weiner, 1965a) and in Indonesia (Feith, 1963). The developing countries corresponding to Riggs’ models are in fact Myrdal’s (1968:895–900) “soft states.” The methods such states are able, or prepared to use to reach their goals are inadequate. Riggs’ analysis leads to two generalizations: (1) public administration in developing countries does not function very effectively; (2) lack of resources or skilled men may be partly responsible; but other, underlying, cultural factors also play important parts.

**CONTROL AND CHANGE**

Thompson (1964) believes that lessons learned from the West cannot be applied uncritically to developing countries, because the conditions and the needs are different. “Administrative practices and principles of the West have derived from preoccupation with control and therefore have little value for development administration in underdeveloped countries where the need is for adaptive administration, one that can incorporate constant change” (Thompson, 1964:91). Western norms such as rationality result from social and cultural conditions. “Attempts to impose such behavioral norms upon an administrative system could only fail and would probably produce disintegrative effects upon a society” (Thompson, 1964:92). In Thompson’s view, teachings of public administration have been preoccupied with control, which is an ideal of a static world, but which is less relevant to situations of rapid change.

But it is not obvious that control is an ideal of a static world, and it is incorrect to characterize Western countries as static and non-Western countries as rapidly changing. Western countries are changing, not static; and non-Western countries are changing rapidly, but are not changing sufficiently rapidly in desired directions. This is what the problem of development is about. Rapidly changing conditions in non-Western countries do not mean that adaptiveness and inventiveness or development abound. They indicate, rather, a lack of stability: the actions of government are hard to predict, and uncertainty and insecurity prevail. Before there is growth or adaptation in developing countries, a certain level of stability may be necessary (Almond and Powell, 1966), although stability should not be equated with rigidity or inflexibility (Eisenstadt, 1968:xv).

Thompson argued that, while Western experiences normally do not provide principles or lessons applicable to underdeveloped countries, crisis situations in Western countries do provide such principles. “Administration in a crisis is characterized by authority, status, and jurisdictional ambiguity; indefiniteness of assignment; uncontrolled communication; group decision; problem orientation; and a high level of excitement and morale” (Thompson, 1964:108; cf. Argyris, 1967). Thompson did not define what constitutes a crisis, but a recent working definition said that, in an organiza-
tion, a crisis "(1) threatens high-priority values of the organization, (2) presents a restricted amount of time in which a response can be made, and (3) is unexpected or unanticipated by the organization" (Hermann, 1963:64). The evidence on what happens in Western crises does not completely agree with Thompson's description; there may even be a tendency for authority to contract rather than to become more diffuse (Hermann, 1963; Paige, 1966). So it is difficult to know what principles, or lessons, to apply to developing countries.

Thompson's Prescriptions

However, Thompson's (1964:93–94) prescriptions for developing countries are worth examination. Administration in those countries, he said, should not emphasize control. "The ideal must be adaptation, and this involves creativity and a looseness of definition and structure." He therefore put forward some interdependent administrative conditions, or objectives, which are "necessary for the most effective development administration": an innovative atmosphere, operational and shared planning goals, the combination of planning and action, a cosmopolitan atmosphere, the diffusion of influence, the toleration of interdependence, and the avoidance of bureau pathology. Two features in Thompson's argument are examined: his ideas on the role of generalists and specialists, as related to some of his administrative conditions, and the last of his administrative conditions, avoidance of bureau pathology.

Thompson (1961) argued that the most symptomatic characteristic of modern bureaucracy in Western countries is the growing imbalance between ability and authority, arising from the relationships between specialist and hierarchical roles. Thompson attacked the hierarchical institution as monocentric, a system of superior-subordinate relationships in which the superior is the only source of legitimate influence upon the subordinate. He pointed out the incompatibility of hierarchical and monocratic views of organization with the fact of technical interdependence (cf. Likert, 1961). However, Thompson did not explain clearly just how coordination could be achieved in organizations where the claims of technical ability were fully acknowledged and seemed to exaggerate the possibilities of successful spontaneous cooperation (cf. Crozier, 1966; Downs, 1967; Tullock, 1965).

Some of Thompson's hypotheses on generalists and specialists in non-Western countries are also open to objection. It is true that many bureaucrats who are generalists in developing countries do emphasize hierarchy and often tend to "hypostatize their programs and procedures into natural laws and to forget their purely instrumental origin" (Thompson, 1964:105); however, it is incorrect to say that recruits to, for example, the present Indian Administrative Service and the Civil Service of Pakistan, or their counterparts in some other countries, are amateurs or lack pre-entry training. He is also incorrect in saying that such services are parochial; indeed they constitute one of the few national instruments for bridging regional and local differences (Hart, 1967). And, although the tradition of such services was formerly that of the "gentleman generalist," the present services do not seem to lack "integrating generalists" (Gross, 1966).

In contrast to the parochial generalist, said Thompson (1965), the specialist is cosmopolitan. But this may be rather an idealized picture. In developing countries, as compared with developed, the number of specialists and their general level of competence is likely to be low, and there is little evidence that they are cosmopolitan. The indigenous specialists are presumably no broader in their views than are those who teach them. Foster (1962:186–187) has said that professional compartmentalization, a function of American culture, tends to be exported along with professional knowledge. "Professional indoctrination, it seems to me, often makes it difficult for a well-trained person to appreciate fully the contributions that are made by specialists in other fields and to realize that the success of these specialists will enhance the value of one's own work." There is no reason to believe that in developing countries specialists would be cosmopolitan in their views and would be free from jealousy about their specialisms; they would therefore not find it easy to agree on shared operational goals. So, although Thompson (1964:95) believes shared operational goals "are the products
of a community of experts," experts cannot be expected to be any more successful than generalists in setting shared operational goals in developing countries.

Even assuming that specialists were able to come to some kind of agreement on goals, there would still be a serious obstacle to their implementation. Studies of the relationship between generalists and specialists in developing countries have always alluded to, and frequently deplored, the ascendancy of the generalists over the specialists (Goodnow, 1964; Guyot, 1966). Generalists may therefore be expected to oppose determinedly, and usually successfully, goals framed by experts with whom they do not agree.

Even if experts were to reach substantial agreement on goals and convince other officials and politicians of their desirability, would these goals necessarily take account of the public's values? In Riggs' account of the ease with which officials escape control in developing countries, there is nothing to suggest that specialists are any more accountable to the public than are other officials. Years ago, writing about colonial Southeast Asia, Furnivall (1948:420) pointed out that the great mass of the population did not understand the expert, nor did the expert understand the public. "In Europe there is an organic community, living its own life, which can decide for itself what it wants most, but in the tropics, where innovations are pressed on the people from the outside, there naturally ensues a lack of coordination between the competing and often contrary activities of the departmental specialists." These observations are probably also true today.

Thompson's list of administrative conditions is relevant, but only because the pathological traits are actually the expected normal traits of administrative behavior in developing countries. He has contributed to the diagnosis, but not to the solution. An example will show the difficulty in applying Thompson's administrative conditions. He says that the atmosphere of insecurity which may block the administrative conditions from being effective "can result from the existence of an arbitrary, nonrational, and unpredictable authority at the very top, as in the case of an authoritarian, single-party, political system" (Thompson, 1964:100). The conclusion must be that any plans for substantially improving administration in such a political system must be postponed until there is a change in the type of regime.

Perhaps the crucial part of Thompson's (1964:100) argument concerns the avoidance of bureau pathology: "All of the administrative conditions of development administration outlined above will be absent (or weak) in an organization dominated by personal insecurity. Personal insecurity in an authority position is likely to create personal needs of such magnitude as to dominate over organizational needs." The resulting pathological or bureau pathic behavior is manifested in such forms as "close supervision; failure to delegate; emphasis on regulations, quantitative norms, precedents, and the accumulation of paper to prove compliance; cold aloofness; insistence on office protocol; fear of innovation; or restriction of communication." Some of these have already been mentioned. Cold aloofness clearly derives from a lack of egalitarian norms, a prominent characteristic of developing countries (Presthus, 1961; Braibanti, 1966; Willner, 1966). Insistence on office protocol may perhaps be regarded as a product of the emphasis on ritualistic procedures plus the lack of egalitarian norms. Fear of innovation, according to Thompson, may be attributed, among other things, to a lack of personal security and a hierarchical climate. To this may be added an absence of resources, e.g., money and skills (Thompson, 1965). The last manifestation of pathological behavior is restriction of communication, which may follow from the lack of personal security and also from the high value placed on status or hierarchy (Pye, 1962).

Thompson's emphasis on personal insecurity as the main factor is justified. Its influence in producing the types of behavior he listed is clear, particularly the failure to delegate and the ritualistic and legalistic protections provided by the accumulation of paper. The situation in which civil servants work in an underdeveloped country can only be described as "Hobbesian" (Montgomery, 1966; Pye, 1962). Even the
title, *Politics of Distrust in Iran* (Westwood, 1965) makes this point. The prevailing lack of security is occasioned partly by the fear of betrayal by one’s colleagues and lack of trust in them and in others with whom one has to deal. Pye (1962:106) remarked on the absence of effective associational sentiments and attributed the emphasis on ritualistic procedures in crisis situations to a search for “the rigid security of legalistic forms” (cf. Stene, 1956:56). There is a double standard in the treatment of relatives and friends, on the one hand, and of everyone else on the other hand. The bureaucrat can rarely enter successfully into an impersonal, functional, or bureaucratic relationship. The world is peopled only with friends and enemies, not with impartial impersonal functionaries (Thompson, 1961; Pye, 1962). There is therefore a tendency to turn bureaucratic impersonal relationships into personal friendly ones. To some extent personal insecurity also results from an accurate perception that the resources available for the organization are small and are not likely to rise as fast as needs, and that the competition for resources is therefore likely to be savage and intense. Bureaucrats in developing societies believe in, and act on, the concept of limited good (Foster, 1965).

The gravity of Thompson’s diagnosis reduces the probability that his interdependent administrative conditions can be effective, since they would be absent, or weak, in an organization possessing bureaucapathic traits, especially in one dominated by personal insecurity. Yet bureaucapathic behavior is typical of developing countries, and the norms underlying this behavior result largely from social and cultural conditions. Consequently, from Thompson’s own argument, attempts to impose other cultural norms to replace the bureaucapathic ones would have little success, in the short run at least.

Thompson’s administrative conditions for developing countries implicitly recommend an organic model of organization (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Bennis, 1963; Hage, 1965). In this model, according to Burns and Stalker, tasks are not distributed among specialist roles within a clearly defined hierarchy, but duties and responsibilities are redefined continually by interaction with others participating in a task. Interaction occurs laterally as well as vertically, and omniscience is not imputed to the head of the organization. Gouldner’s (1959) natural system model also has a resemblance to the organic model (cf. Selznick, 1949). Burns and Stalker contrast this organic system with the mechanistic system. In the mechanistic system the problems and tasks are broken down into specialist roles; each individual pursues his task as something distinct from the tasks of the organization as a whole, and those at the head of the organization are responsible for ensuring that individual tasks are relevant to the purposes of the organization. Interaction within management tends to be vertical between superior and subordinate, and management is visualized as a complex hierarchy, as in organization charts. The mechanistic system, in its emphasis on hierarchy and formal procedures, strongly resembles the administrative system as it is supposed to operate in developing countries, in contrast to the way in which it actually works.

The Burns and Stalker models refer to private administration in developed countries, not to public administration in developing countries. Nevertheless, their analysis shows the difficulties which would stand in the way of implementing Thompson’s recommendations for public administration in developing countries. It is clear that it would be difficult for organizations corresponding to the organic model to operate successfully in developing countries. This is largely because hierarchy is too deeply rooted in the cultures. Also, the relatively unstructured organic system may cause anxiety to executives (Burns and Stalker, 1961) intensifying the feelings of personal insecurity already prevalent. Above all, organic systems require trust (Bennis, 1963), yet trust is lacking in organizational relationships in developing countries.

**DISCUSSION**

The preceding argument may be summarized and carried a little further in the form of a few hypotheses. One hypothesis would be that successful organizations in developed countries have features of both
organic and mechanistic models. The emphasis is on specialization and hierarchy, and there is less opportunity for lateral control by specialists than Thompson would like to see; but, in addition to the formal organization, there is an accompanying informal organization. Not all aspects of the informal organization contribute to the goals of the formal organization. But some of them do, and without the informal organization the formal organization would work much less successfully. Although in developed countries informal behavior may "divert a great deal of its members' activities from achieving the formal purposes of the bureau to manipulating conditions of power, income and prestige inside the bureau," the purposes are not entirely frustrated (Downs, 1967:73). The individual interests of bureaucrats may conflict with the interests of the organization, but individuals still feel some loyalty to the organization. Barnard (1938:148) lists among the inducements and incentives for individuals to contribute to organizations the condition of communion, which is sometimes called solidarity, social integration, or the gregarious instinct. "It is the opportunity for comradeship, for mutual support in personal attitudes."

In developing countries the situation is quite different. Shortage of skills, deficiencies in training, lack of resources, and poor communications constitute obstacles to effective administration. But more important than this are the cultural factors which hinder attempts to introduce effective administrative practices. Organic solutions along the lines recommended by Thompson offer no escape; the culture is also hostile to them. The great advantage of an organic solution in a developed country lies in the loyalty to the organization which it makes possible. But in any attempt to create an organic administrative organization in a developing country, one cannot rely on loyalty to the organization. The only loyalty which can be relied on, under conditions of unlimited distrust and limited good, is loyalty to personal goals, to family, to cliques, and to friends; in other words, to small groups. Informal behavior would not parallel formal behavior throughout the organization. It would operate in small networks or pockets.

The different degrees of loyalty to organizations in developing countries are well brought out in Banfield's (1958:86-87) study of a commune in southern Italy. He introduced the concept of amoral familism, which he defined negatively as follows: "No matter how selfish or unscrupulous most of its members may be, a society is not amoral individualistic (or familistic) if there is somewhere in it a significant element of public spiritedness or even of 'enlightened' self interest." He put forward the hypothesis that in a society of amoral familists, organization, i.e., deliberately concerted action, will be very difficult to achieve and maintain. In societies that are not characterized by amoral familism, the inducements that lead people to contribute their activity to organizations are to a significant degree unselfish; i.e., there is identification with the purpose of the organization. Also the inducements are often nonmaterial. "Moreover, it is a condition of successful organization that members have some trust in each other and some loyalty to the organization. In an organization with high morale it is taken for granted that they will make small sacrifices, and perhaps even large ones, for the sake of the organization." But these conditions are not fulfilled in a society of amoral familists acting in accordance with their perceptions of limited good. Where such a situation is perceived, loyalty to the family exhausts the individual's supply of loyalty, leaving little or none available for the organization.

The argument is illustrated by Pye's description of formal and informal administration in Burma. He observed that

The bureaucracies of many transitional societies prove to be weak and ineffectual because they must depend to an exaggerated degree on formal, legalistic and functionally specific relationships which are not reinforced by informal patterns of association and communication. Paradoxically, some of these bureaucrats come the closest to relying only upon what have been called the modern forms of relationships, while it is more common in advanced societies to find officials cutting red tape, pushing aside formalistic procedures, exploiting personal and private associations, and generally getting on with the job despite bureaucratic obstacles (1962:40-41).
Pye (1962:216–217) expanded the point later.

The Burmese, instead of being unduly influenced by personal relationships in their administrative procedures, have gone to the other extreme. They have tried to operate their administrative machinery without the benefit of reinforcing and functionally compatible informal patterns of communication and association . . . . It is only at the point when the formal procedures are so overloaded as to produce paralysis that informal considerations enter into Burmese administrative behavior. At this stage, however, the informal considerations no longer reinforce the purpose and spirit of the formal procedures but become counterlegal in nature, for instance, when licenses are granted for personal reasons.

Pye’s account is open to criticism. It is not at all obvious, for example, that formal procedures would have to be overloaded before personal relations influenced decisions. It is more likely that friends and high status clients would receive personal preference, at the same time as others were subjected to formal procedures. But the main point raised is worth considering. Did the Burmese, out of a wide range of possibilities, perversely choose to adopt informal behavior that weakened the purpose of formal procedures? A likely hypothesis is that the Burmese did not choose perversely, but that the range of choice was limited; once formal procedures were departed from, most of the informal behavior likely to occur would operate against the purposes of formal procedures and not in favor of them. More generally, the hypothesis may be advanced that, for the most part, informal administrative behavior is more likely to impede the goals of the organization in developing countries than is in developed countries (Riggs, 1962; Valsan, 1968; Milne, forthcoming).

The differences described above seem to be rooted in the cultures of developing countries. Banfield (1958:8) indicated that the conditions impeding the operation of any kind of organization in developing countries, whether based on mechanistic or organic models, were largely cultural and could not be successfully overcome by institutional manipulation alone.

We are apt to take it for granted that economic and political associations will quickly arise wherever technical conditions and natural resources permit. If the state of the technical arts is such that large gains are possible by concerting the activity of many people, capital and organizing skill will appear from somewhere, and organizations will spring up and grow. This is the comfortable assertion that is often made.

The assumption is wrong because it overlooks the crucial importance of culture. People live and think in very different ways, and some of these ways are radically inconsistent with the requirements of formal organization. One could not, for example, create a powerful organization in a place where everyone could satisfy his aspirations by reaching out his hand to the nearest coconut. Nor could one create a powerful organization in a place where no one would accept orders or direction.

(See also Weiner, 1965b.) To this quotation one might add that culture may adversely affect informal, as well as formal, organization. Braibanti (1966:168) has argued, with particular reference to American technical assistance programs in Pakistan, that certain bureaucratic modes of behavior are so enmeshed in culture that any effective inducement of change by direct effort appears improbable and can occur only when changes are made in the larger society. In listing preconditions for effective administration Makielski (1967) not only mentions a basic skill pool, organizational experience, and organizational language, but also administrative norms. He is thinking primarily, perhaps, of norms among the public, for example, automatic compliance and honesty in filling in tax forms, but internal administrative norms based on mutual trust among the members of an organization are also a precondition (Schelling, 1963:92).

Although cultural factors set limits to organizational effectiveness in developing countries, variations in effectiveness nevertheless do exist within countries. Abuvea (1966:54) pointed to a whole range of examples in the Filipino bureaucracy. At one extreme there were “decisional areas of known unmitigated cathexis and individual bargaining, such as patronage in semi-skilled and unskilled labor in public works projects.” At the other extreme were decisional areas where, generally, rules were applied and
services were rendered objectively, "where official duties and obligations clearly transcend cathexis and bargaining as the form of exchange among the parties concerned in the official transaction" (1966:54-55). He cited as examples public education and health services, postal services, and the public use of roads and parks. One could hypothesize that administration was more effective and objective where competition for the services provided was less keen, as for health and education, than where competition was keen; and subjectively the situation was seen in terms of limited good (and limited security), for example, as regards the provision of jobs. Also, the hypothesis may be advanced that in developing countries the possibility of loyalty to an organization which transcends loyalty to one’s own interest, family, or clique, is greatest when the organizational unit is small. It is significant that two of the examples given by Valsan (1968) to illustrate positive and beneficial departures from formal rules in developing countries related to small organizational units, village panchayats in India. Presumably, in a small organization it is easier for the individual to identify his goals with the organization’s goals than in a larger organization where the goals seem remote and irrelevant.

Conceivably, a study of such variations in effectiveness might point the way to how administration could be improved within the cultural context, yet the previous analysis suggested some of the limitations. In the Abueva example, competition for some services was less than for others, so for them an objective application of rules and rendering of services was made possible. But in general, competition for services must be keen, because by definition the country concerned is developing and therefore resources are relatively scarce. Behavior is indeed cultural in the sense that it arises from perceptions of limited good and limited security. But it is also rationally based on actual material conditions. The perception of limited good and limited security is accurate; in point of fact both are extremely limited. A possible danger is that cultural impediments to administration may persist even after they are no longer grounded on fact. There may be an inaccurate perception of limited good and limited security after material conditions have improved. There may also be accurate perception that one resource, namely time, is less limited in developing countries than in developed ones. In Turkey, “far from being a scarce resource, time is defined as a relatively abundant commodity” (Presthus, 1961:15). However, the qualification may be made that in developing countries there is a sharp contrast between the higher and the lower levels of the civil service; in the former time is a limited good, while in the latter it seems almost unlimited (Riggs, 1964:112–113).

There are also restrictions on the application of the Valsan model, for it did not solve the problem of how to preserve loyalty when the small unit has to be related to other units, with a consequent conflict of interests. The existence of variations in organizational effectiveness within a developing country, however, does indicate the possibility of modest, marginal reforms within the culture. The culture sets a limit to the possibility of administrative improvements, but administrative reformers and those who train administrators are, in one sense, not completely culturebound.

CONCLUSION

There is no simple correspondence between mechanistic models and developed countries, on the one hand, and organic models and developing countries, on the other. Administration in developed countries is more effective than administration in developing countries because of its superiority in both mechanistic (formal) terms, and in organic (informal) terms. The obstacles to effective administration in developing countries are mainly cultural. The cultures neither permit effective control and coordination from above, as in the mechanistic model, nor do they permit lateral, or mutual, control or coordination, as in the organic model. One should not conclude from this that administrative improvement is impossible. The main conclusion is rather the obvious one that proposed administrative reforms must be conceived largely in terms of cultural conditions, and that, in the short run, their effective scope will be severely
limited by the cultures, no matter whether the stress is laid on the mechanistic or organic aspects.

R. S. Milne is a professor of political science at the University of British Columbia.

REFERENCES


Heady, Ferrel 1957 “The Philippine administrative sys-
Hermann, Charles F.
1963 “Some consequences of crisis which limit the viability of organizations.” Administrative Science Quarterly, 8: 61–82.
Likert, Rensis
Makielski, S. K., Jr.
Milne, R. S.
Montgomery, John D.
Montgomery, John D., and William J. Siffin (eds.)
1966 Approaches to Development. New York: Mcgraw-Hill.
Mvrdal, Gunnar
Ness, Gavl D.
Paipe, Glenn D.
Presbustus, Robert V.
Pye, Lucian W.
Riggs, Fred W.
1964 Administration in Developing Countries. Boston; Houghton Mifflin.
Schelling, Thomas C.
Selznick, Philip
Siffin, William J.
Stene, Edwin O.
Thompson, Victor A.
Tickner, E. J.
Tullock, Gordon
Valsan, E. H.
Weiner, Myron
1965a “India: two political cultures.” In Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.), Political Culture and Political
Milne: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Westwood, Andrew F.
Willner, Ann Ruth